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The Siege of Cypru'S .~In Bosiols Ismria';' 
The aspect of Veneto-Maltese relations which forms 
the subject of this study, as deduced from Jacomo Bosio's 
account of the siege of Cyprus, has two elements. The 
first element is that of de'lineating Malta's mIte in Venice's 
most decisive event ,in the sixteenth century, that forms 
the narrative backbone of the war of Cyprus as related by 
Bosio. The second is more ephemerai1, but unquestionably 
important since Bosio, In Ms capacity as offioial historian 
of the Order, lis writing extensive~y about a foreign State. 
This dm. itself creates an academic relationshiip distinct, by 
its histoniographk .nature, ,from the actuail. content of Boslio's 
account. It ~s therefore the present intention to evaluate 
BosJo's account dill order to establish !its va!~idity as a hither-
to neglected pliimary source, which is an itself a preoious 
contI1ibutio.n to Venetian histodography. BOSQo's origdnahlty 
as a narrative source is here being considered exclusively 
with reference to Venetian hii'storiography. 
On 1 May 1570 the Order's four-ga.!l.:ley squadron re-
turned to Maltal after haViing been unitIltentionaHy 2 en-
gaged for over four months :in the defence OIf the Spanish 
fortress of La Goletta,3 threatened by Euldj A1N's unexpected 
reconquest of Tunis early in Jal!1Uary that year. 4 Its origil11al 
mission on leavdng the ,island on 29 December had been to 
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seek from the Sioilian V!iceroy fresh tratte and supplies of 
cheese, meaJt and other provis1ions.5 Besides, the Counctl of 
the Order had g1i.ven Fra Francesco de SaJint Clement, the 
new Captain General of the Fleet ,6 secret IiJl1structions to 
seize, and dtirrect to Mailta, ailJ. gram-laden vessels he would 
come across. 7 The Order had to resort to these Vliolent 
methods m reta1:iJartion agaillnst TUl1kJish corsairs and gal1ley 
squadrons lately despatched from Constantinople to distract 
Christlian states from their defens1ive plfepara'biohs. 8 For 
MaJIta, since late :1569, had been lin a state of impending 
siege. Se]jIm II's rearl intentioos and his miillirtary des'igns for 
the Turkish aTmada during the w,inter of 1569-70 were not 
known with any ceria:inty or preo1sion. The 1nternational re-
putation which the Porte had ~ost by the humil!iatiJIlg defeat 
suffered at Malta in 1565 and at Szigeth Itn 1566 had not yet 
been regained. If La Goletta and Cyprus were, as ,it was 
being rumoured, the object of the heavy preparations under 
way at the arsenals of ConstantilD.ople, so too was MalLta. 9 
Specuilations Like these could not be di:smissed :in an 
island where the sUghtest development din the Mediterran-
ean, the smaililest shtft in the intemationalL barlance of forces, 
was limmediately reflected. AllI necessary precautions had 
to be taken. The fortifications of the new oity of VaHetta 
had reached a sufficiently advanced stage to arrlow it to 
withstand any major attack,lO to prove lits worth as, in 
Pius V's own words, "opportUJluisswum adversus Turcos 
et predones Airos tollius Chrlist,1ani populi propugnaculum."ll 
Grand Master Del Monte therefore ~ssued orders to begLn 
having the city well-equipped and fully provislioned wtith alll 
the .necessary food supplies, "w.ithout which," wrttes Bosio,12 
"any great fortress renders itself vain a.nd useless". 1800 
troops were recruited ;in Naples and Sici1ly. Agozzini reali 
were a.ppoi.nted. Help was sought from the Pope, whiJ.e a 
generatl summons reca!11ed all[ Knilghts Hospita'Ners to their 
headquarters lin Malta.13 However, ten days after the aif-
rival of the gaHey squadron, Fra Giovan Baitwsta V:ivaldo 
returned from the Levant,14. "portando aviso certiss1mo, che 
l'Annata Turchesoa contra IiJ. Regno di Cipro indubitata-
mente s'dndlilrizzava."51 By that tdiIIle the TUJrkiish war on the 
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Venetian "jeweu,"16 the most advanced ChI1istian outpost in 
the eastern Mediterranean, [had a:lready begun.17 
As soon as the dimmi!nent danger of a threatened attack 
on Ma:lta was over, precautionary measures were dilSc.ontin-
ued. 18 The island could breathe again; at least temporanily, 
for lit was perenniaLly plagued w~th simHar rumours. Was 
not the s,ituation of 1569-70 an almost ~dentica1 replica of 
those of 1566/9 1567°0 and 156821? Thi:s was a costly ex-
perience whlfch 'm1Vo,lved the Order :in extraordinani:ly ex-
hausting expenses and c.ompletely monopolised the re-
sources of tihe Commoo Treasury."2 Absorbed in these 00-
ficullties and ,in the heavy responsilbiLiity of directmg the 
Order lin these hard times, Del Monte seriousl:y eruterl\:ali01.ed 
the idea of reHnquishing the magl~strarcy and retiT'.ing to 
Monte Cassino.23 It was an .opportune moment now that the 
Ottoman forces were concentrated entirrely on Cyprus. At 
least he would not be accused of cowardly behay.ioUT'.24 A 
papail bnief expressed the Supreme Pontiff's "desiI1e" for 
him to retCllin hrs post.25 He was stiH needed at th~ helm 
of the Order. 
Bosio's main concern llin the thirrd part of his Dell'lstoria 
del/a Sacral ReZigilolne et l'll.ma Militia di S. Giovanni Giero-
soiUmitano, pubhl'shed an Rome in 1602, was to leave for 
posterity "a true narrative" of the "heroic and V1irrtuouS 
deeds" of the Knights Hospilita!llers duringthelir tupbulant 
odyssey from 'the m.oment they were ey.tcted firom Rhodes 
in January 11623 to Maroh 1571 when, 00 the eve of the 
much celebrated victory of Lepanto, and after a long and 
unhappy sojourn at the Borgo in Ma:1ta, they migrated to 
the new dty of Va!~letta. Towards the end of his narrabive,26 
BOSlio gives a farlmly clear pIi~tute of the first campaign of 
the siege of Cyprus which led to ;tihe radl of NicoSlia in 1570. 
Hiis version lis interesting. Though inairlentClll' to :his main 
theme, ,it provides more insiight into the sIltuation than one 
w.oiWld nOrlmaHy expect in such a context, for Clllithough the 
positive conmbution to the ca:mpa1gn of the Order's galluey 
squadron was more tangible than either Gian Andrea Dorni:a's 
or 1C001onna's, the role it actually played was a minor one. 
It ~s moreover particularly interesting to Venetian 
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hlstoriography. We have here another contemporary 
Christian view of one of 'bhe most outstanding landmarks 
:in Venetian hi!story, based ailmost envi:rely on non-Venetian, 
first-hand documentary sources - Bosio had complete ac-
cess to the Order's archives. It d,s ma!rked with a host of 
miJnute detai!ls on the situation ieadutng up to the siege, the 
condiJtlions under which ,the frag;~le tDiple alil~ance eVQilved 
durling the aotual naval operations, the motives, amhiJtions, 
mutual hostlilities of the leading persOitla!HtJies, the state and 
movements IOf the allied fleets, the hardships and brutallities 
suffered by the unaided Ni:cosiians during and after the failll 
of thelir capital, and 1astly, with frequent, often vaJ1uabie, 
crlOss-references to the Ottoman slide. These and IOther 
aspects, l'iike the not altogether unfounded rumours of 
Venice's attempt to neglOtiate secretly wiJth the enemy during 
the winter of 1570-71, are approached by the sdxteenth cen-
tury ohronicler with accuracy ,and seeming detachment, and 
are presented - as ,is to be expected - Wlithin the frame-
work of the Re']1gion's partioipation tin the whole episode. 
In the course of his tintelligence m1ssilOn to the Levant, 
Giovan BatNsta Viivaldo had had occasion to' dtiscuss the 
state IOf affaillrs dJn the Turkish empitre Wlith various governors 
and other offioiails of Corfu, Zante and Cefalonia.27 BOS10 
confessed to having based parts of Ms narraUve on the 
substance of Viivalldo's report to the Counoil at the end of 
hUs missdon. 
1n 1540 Venice had concluded peace w1th the Porte.28 
In ,1567, shor1Jly after Sebim H's accession to the sultanate, 
the treaty was reconfirmed29 in rather unnea'lthy citrcum-
stances.30 It is to these ohanged circumstances, :which bore 
the maTk of Sellim's characte'r and ambitions, that Bos,io 
attributes the cause of the breakJing-off of Veneto-Ottoman 
relations after nearly thirty years of peace. SeHm H's per-
sonallity lacked the stature and grandeur of his father's.31 
Gtiven excessively to wine and debauchery, SeMm at forty-
three was "coarse, unders,ized and corpulent."82 His rUIDng 
ambition when he came to the throne was to have an imaret, 
a new urban complex,33 constructed near Adrianople as am. 
expression and symbQiI of great luxury,34 to emulate Suley-
man in magnificence, and to mark the begitnnling of firs reign 
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by some outstanding feat a;ga;inst Christendom that would 
simi:ltarly surpass hi's elders din mhlli'tary achievement. Bosio 
gives a detailred descr:iptJioo of the imaret,35 which he calls 
"a'lmarat. " 
imarets are hospitals after the Turkil:sh fashion, with a 
mosque 'and schools to tra:iIn chHdren :in Mohammedan 
Law, around whioh many dwel1Jing places are usuaUy 
ibuiillt, in the form of rotundas, with leaden roofs, to house 
the priests and doctors of tIie above-mentioned Law and 
a:l1so to provide shelter and hospice to traveHers and 
pihlgrlims oif alIl n;:Ltions and rel~gions. Here they are 
fireelyaccomodated, together w.iJth thek servants and 
horses, ,for rthree days for the love of God; allld here 
handsome alms is given, proviidling the netghbouri'lIlg poor 
Wlilth a:lil the bread they need and an asper a day. And 
since these imarets cannot be endowed with qands that 
have already been acquired for the Empire, nor with 
money from the Casna, the Treasury of the Grand Turk, 
they can only be subs:tdized with the dtizens' revenues 
and ki.ngdoms [original~lyJ belonging to, and [lately] re-
conquered by the Grrund Turk 
The conquest of Cyprus would satisfy Selim's double 
ambition admurably. The revenues accrued from thi's Ve-
netilan colony wouJld go towards the erection of this 
"cha1iLM:ble"36 ,instrltution. Besddes, would not the conquest 
of Cyprus emse for ever the hitter memories of Ma;lta and 
gdive powerful strategic advallltages to the Ottomans? T,ime 
too was tin his favour. In September 1569 the Venetian 
arsenail had been destroyed by fire, and the "damage sus-
tamed," wrtiltes Bosio,37 "was imrug;ined to have been much 
worse 'than lit actua:l'ly was." In !fact, Selim believed that 
the Venetialll fleet too had met the same fate !in the con-
flagratrlon. 38 To compound the situation, Venice was si-
mUllitaneously suffemng a scardty of food, preciipitating into 
the abyss of fami'lIle, wllith exo'fbitantlly hdgh, indeed unpre-
cedented, pl1ices of wheat.39 o,n the other hand, the western 
countries were ttota:lly absorbed dn internal dissensions -
the WaT iIn Granada, the revolt run the Netherlands, the civi[ 
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and reLigious wars ,in France, dlivisio.ns in Germany. They 
were also too divrded among themselves to be able to 
distract the Porte from seeing its grand des.igns realulzed or 
to offer any material the1p to !i:so1aJted, distrusted Venfrce. 
In SeHm's Vi1ew these 'cond!iJtions mateI1ially handicapped 
(he Republic beyond any hope of immediate recovery;10 On 
1 Februa'ry 1570'11 the cavus42 Cubat Parvana was despatched 
from Constantinople to Veruce with "una su:berba e orgo· 
gliosa Ilettera."43. He arrived late un March.'44 On Vhe one 
hand, he oLarumed, Cyprus belonged iby right'15 tOI the 'Otto-
man empire; on the other, Venice was guilty of a double 
breach of falith: first, for having fortified Nicos,ia w1thout 
having prevlilOusly sought, as feudatory of the Grand 
Seigneur, authorization from rtJhe stilltan; and secondly, for 
haViing contravened the tel'llIls of the capitulation by giving 
"shelter to diverse western corsairs" to prey on Turkish 
la,nds~ and have the~r booty soI'd "rin that same island-.".!G 
The suLtan, concluded Cubat, was now determUlI1ed to have 
that kiilngdom back. To th~s "ilingiusta e har.bwa d~anda," 
the Senate retorted w,iIth equal firmness and resolution. For 
fear of the masses,47 Cubat was escorted to the shore from 
where he sailed to Ragusa, and thence by land to Constan-
tinopiIe. The Republic's belLicose ilintentions were an1:lioipated. 
For hardJy had the cavus arr1ved m Venice, towards the 
end of March, than Amurat Rads sa~led out of ConstantJin-
opl~ W1~th twenty~five g,ailI1eys, wilth linstructlio.ns to proceed to 
Rhodes to prevent any aid from Il"eachling Cyprus. The enti're 
Ottoman fleet landanny were ready to set out by the mid-
dne of May.48 
"W,ith haste," remaTks Bosio,49 seemingly unaware of 
the illusory nature of the RepUlblic's ffimpressive deployment 
of forces, "the Venetians proceeded to make the necessary 
pro:vJls1ons for war and defence ... to arm and iliaunoh thetir 
armada whJ1ch they plla!l1ned to assemble at Confu." Pius V 
was soH.cited to dntercede for aid, on their behaJJf, w.iJth the 
other Ohl1tstian powers, partioularly Phil1:ip II oil' Spain. But 
it was Turkey which was better prepared for war, not 
Venice. The Republd.c's immooiate50 approach 1:!hrough Rome 
for aJ European anti-Ottoman aHiance, and Mii'Ohele Soriano's 
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insistence during his mission to Plilus V upon imrned~ate 
he1rp,51 betr.ay an urgent poil:iticail. move to counterbalance 
her defioient technioailand economic prepa:redness - defi-
oient Iby her enemy's standards - to make good the short-
comings d,nherent din her entiTe struoture.52 
W,ithin the context of the current European polr1tical 
sr1tuation, amid pressure and dinterests which drew the Re-
pub1ic, and the pl1inotple of ~~berty for which she stood, 
away raJther tharJ.:owards the 'continental sy;stem,' hers was 
merely a poi1tticaJ gamble, an unknown quan1liJty of great 
moment. 53 Was not coherence among the Christian forces 
noteworthy for lits absence ;in, 1560 ;in face of adverse po-
lliticail devellopments in the BaI1bary cantons? Had it not 
aJlso been wanting dul1ing the siege of Malta in 1565? It 
was most unJJiJkely to emerge now over the question of 
Cyprus. The VenetOl-Habsburg ideological54 rift was too 
W1~de, the two mentalilties too far apart to bridge so quickly, 
Did not the defence of the eastern Me~terranean failJl out-
side Habsburg respons.tbi!1ity? Was not that soleil.y Venice's 
problem?55 Don LUlls de Torres, on behailf of PilUS V, re-
quested PhiHp II, according to Bosio,56 to offer "the Vene-
tiansal:l the help he could nll1stantly afford," to which ap-
peal "ills Majesty willlingly" responded. Bos'io's narrCl!tive 
avoids any ifeference to the delayting tactics employed by 
Spairn and to the mounting mutua!1 suspicion among the con-
tracting partlies which at times paraly;sed d~plomatic com-
mu.11lications. 
There were diVlisiions r1n the government of Malta over 
the question of the Religdon's participation din the war of 
Cyprus. The CounCli~ of the Order was ~v,ided between 
three parties, almost eqUCl!lJly baJlanced,57 on which JJine of 
policy to adopt. In May 1570 the Order had promlised the 
Venetia.n RepubUc its galley flotilla, together wlith "a 
squadron of knights and vaJJiant soldiers" which could be 
"dd~embarked and mairnta:1ned on land" if necessary.58 For 
this purpose on 30 May the gaJIey squadron, under the ge-
neral command of Fra Jean Francois de St. Clement and 
accompanied by the Venetian patrioian Bietro Giustiniani,59 
Prior of Messina and Capitano Generale in Terra, saJiiled for 
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Sticily to fetch munitions, armaments and other proVlis>ions. 
They returned to MMta on 13 June "very weilll supplJied with 
arms and prov:1sions" for the coming warr.60 'f.he 'Venetian' 
party ~n the Order's Counotl held that the fleet should pro-
ceed dtmmed,ilatelyand independently to Corfu, thereby 
honouring the promise made to the RepublJic. 61 The 'papal' 
party wanted the squadron to proceed to Otmnto to meet 
Marrcantol1lio C010nna in Hne with the expressed wdshes of 
Pius V. 62 The th1rd pressure group - the 'Span~sh' ~ in-
sisted that PhHip H's instructions shoUild be adhered to. The 
SidlitaJl1 Vkeroy, the Marchese di Pescara, on behailf of his 
king, had requested the Re1igion's gaU:leys to jO:Ul Gian 
Andrea Doria's squadron "to venture on an expedJit·ion 
against the Infidels," malking no reference to either Cyprus 
or the Vene1Jian M1lllada. Its objeot was ~mtenltionahly?) 
vague. Would it be another expedition to Tunils to rein-
state its exoiled king?63 The Counoil of the Order would 
have found itself an a very difficult situation but for the ar-
nivaJ. of a second papal bnief iUl June which solved the de-
hloate question ofaL1egli>ance. The Religlion's gaJ1ey squadron 
was now being ordered to combine with G1an A:ndrea Doria's 
and the papal squadron under the supreme command of 
Colonna.64 On 21 June 1570 the Council accordiUlgly jssued 
instructions65 to St. Clement to proceed to Pa:lermo on 26 
June Wlith the four-gatley squadfOln to meet Don1a.66 The 
squadron, accorddng to Bosio,67 was "well equipped with 
ciurme and fully armed with soldiers and s·adllorrs." O.n board 
each gaHey was "a select company of 40 to 50 knights." 
On the night of 14-15 July 1570 the wilful negligenceS 
of St. Clement, which ~n the end was to cost him his 1ife, 
caused one of the worst disasters the Order's navy had ever 
expenienced.69 The loss of the Sant' Anna, the San GiovQn.ni 
and the Capitana to the Christian renegade Euldj'Alld dep-
r.i,ved the Order of her ~nstrument of poiJJitdcall and miMtary 
m1ght at a very critical moment in time. Early that month 
the Turks had landed in force on CypruS.TO Pressed as he 
was for time and with a depleted treasury and a very 
restr.icted source of man-power, the dejected Grand Master 
had only ooe alternative left, if he wanted to remain faith-
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ful to hts mission, and that was to seek ,immediate help 
from abroad. 
From the arsenarl of Messana, says Bosio, two or three 
galleys, "in presttto" or ".in renddta," were sought; money, 
slaves, and authorization to recruit oarsmen Ii!n Siailly from 
the Regia Corte. Similar appeaJl.s were made to the Pope71 • 
In the end, three gailileys am.d 10,000 scudi were donated by 
Pihi!J.ip II,12 while the Vliceroy of S;itciJly supplied ']:0 convJcts 
and alll adequa,te provlisions and equ1pment necessary to have 
two of the gal'leys l'aunched at once.73 On thel other hand, 
over 200 M8.iltese oarsmen were recrudted ,locaLly after "ha-
ving been offered a good pay and promised they would not 
be kept ,in servJce against thedr Wlillt once the six-month 
period for wh~ch they were being engaged exp±red.""4 The 
emergency WaJS met. However, the new ga:l'ley squadron, 
now reduced to three,ts ddd not aeave Sidly unUiili 17 Oc-
tooer,r6 proceeding directly to the Levant. Fm Pietro 
Giustiniani was appointed Captalll Geneml of the Fleet:1 
By that time the Tudd'Sh armada under Pia1i Pasha 
had managed to transport the J.anissar'ies, the sipa'his, am-
munition and other .necessary equipment for the siege safe-
ly Ifrom Anato.]JIa to Cyprus. Sectio.ns of the army and the 
artJillery had already been disemba·rked at Limassol and 
other parts of the island "without the sLightest opposition" 
from the Venetians. 78 The Chr;ist~an ;islanders, as Bosio 
calls them, having had .no cavalry to limpede the enemy from 
landing, resolved desperately to pull thellt" aVaJil,able forces 
into the linland capdltal of Nicosia a.nd anto the key port of 
the powerfuilJ1y fmtified FamaJgusta, tee lin queste due clUa 
so:1amente dtfende:rs,L" The Turkish army under Mustafa 
Pasha, havJng overrun the entire ilSlta,ud except for these 
two cities, focused attention on Nkosd1a. 
Bosio, in a manner typical of the siocteenth century 
chronicler, describes very condsely the metropolis, ~i<ving 
in a .nutshel[ a perfect picture of its threadbare state of 
defence. Only as J.:aJte as the previous year, he says, had 
the Venetians begUiIl to fortify the oity "co.n otto Baluardi 
re3!lti non pero ancora incamisoiati!." NOJ" were the fortid1ca-
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nons "in a state of good defence."79 WhiJ1e Mustafii Pasha 
was Launching a massive assault on Nt1cosi:a, Pilialli Pasha 
sailed w:1th the entire fleet (in the archipelago to depflive the 
batteTed ctty of any hope of rel:ief.80 Nkosia feN on 9 
September, after a s,iege of forty-five days, and was over-
whelmed and p~]laged. 81 The fate of about eighty thousand 
inhahiltants82 is best described by Boslio hi!mself.B3 
Mustafii Pasha, hav,ing vehemently besieged the oity of 
Nicos'ia for many days, finally launched a genE~raa as-
sault from four sides. On 9 September he v:iolen1Jly con-
quered it, putting to the sword atH the Christians that 
were found there ,and, when the barbarlians were a!lmost 
tJiTed of this great massacre, they took the rest s'vaves by 
order of Mustafa. 
"OnTy a full-scale counter-invasciOJ1 of the lisland" would 
have saved the dty.84 Given the condition olf the combined 
Christian fleets, paflaJlysed by "linter-alliied dissens1ion," thiis 
was weN-nigh d'mpossible not only to achieve but even to 
attempt. 
111 July 1570 the Venet~an armada, under the command 
of Girolamo Zane, was stationed at Corfu, waiti:ng for the 
impendling arrivail of the Spanish and papal forces. Bosio's 
portmit of Zane85 - "Senatore prudentisstimo, e Personag-
gio di grand' esper.ienza" - is at best too generous, at 
worst biased, almost misleadingly :inaccurate. Would a more 
faJilthfUll pl1cture of the Venetila:n admiral have been cautiousiLy 
censo:r:ed by the Order? It lis only on one occasion, when 
the TUTlkiish armada was known to have been illn the island 
of Stampa1ia dn the Aegean, that Bosio makes a passing re-
ference to ZaIlle's painfut state of indecisdon.86 When the 
75-year old admi:ratl, one time aspl:r:ant to the dogeshiip,81 
was dism~sed from office on 13 December ,1570, the great 
hlstorian of the Order records co!Jdly the bare facts, and 
leaves lirt art; that.88 Giroilamo Zane was no man of the sea; 
nor had he matured through the grades of a .naval or ma-
rmme career. Gilan-Andrea DoI'lia was for OJ1ce I1ight !in de-
nouncing him as wanting dJn expeni:ence in this particular 
field. 89 The Veneti!an htstoI'lian U go Tucci oaJl1s him "teclhni-
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catty linexpemenced ... ,irresolute and wtth no wi.l!1-power."90 
This objective descr.iption of him was richly justified by 
events. But af this was the true image of the man, why di.d 
the Venetian Senate m the first place entru.st him with that 
exacting task? Secondly, to what extent were the results 
of the chain of events or .non-events, from the moment he 
sctiled down the Adrianic to his dismi'ssal, his entire res-
ponsibia.ity? There ,is ample room, it seems, for further re-
search on the subject. 
After waiting for the western fleets for over a month 
at Corfu,91 the VeneHan armada, decimated by a heavy Joss 
of life on boarr-d and handicapped by .newly recruited crews 
and ga'JILey sJaves "unaccustomed to the hardship of the 
sea,"92 ~eft for Crete in order to have a number of ill-
equipped galleys refitted and reinforced. It was at this 
junoture, on 31 August 1570, that G~an-Andrea Donia and 
Maroanton~o Colonna arrtived at the Cretan port oIf Suda, 
a convenient place to rendezvous "but short of supp1ies."93 
Doria's objective, at cross purposes with the Venet-
ian's,9.1 its cleady spelt out from the first moment we en-
counter him ,in Bos:io's narrative. He had :hardly arrived 
when he publtidsed his premo1JiV'ated des'~gns ,ID such a way 
as to make them seem spo.ntaneous to his a:mli:es. The state 
of the VeneHan atrmada seemed a reasonable pretext. It 
wouLd not be wise to approach the enemy with a fleet 
"molrta zoppa e moTto ma,l J:lidotta per la gran mortalita che 
in essa era regnata."95 The Venetians were not m a posi-
tJion to fight. Doma estimated, accordJilng to Boslio, that the 
outbrealk of sick:.ness had caused the loss of about twenty 
thousand Lives.96 But what if the entire fleet were to be re-
i<lllforced wilth suLtabJe crews and infantrymen, as in fact it 
was?91 The chronicler does not hesitate here to state the 
whOile truth: the afl']ied ChI1istian forces were ha;mpered by 
lack of harmony ("assaJi. mal d'accordo"), even on the very 
raisiO-n d' etre of their missiOUl in the Levant, the Liberation 
of Cyprus. n Or was !iJt the means of achdeV'ing that end that 
caused discord? From the port of Suda, the :a~1ied atrmada 
saJiled to the port of Sitia, the farthest Cretam. port towards 
the Levant. 99 Should ,they then proceed to Cyprus or should 
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they divert the Twrkish forces by attaclmg other parts of 
the Ottoman empire? On 17 September the Chl'li!stian arm-
ada ,left the bay of Sitda and saiJ.ed in the direction of 
Cyprus. On approachhng Rhodes, LU'igi Bembo reported that 
Nicosia had falHen and been ransacked on 9 September.loo 
On 22 September the armada aIrlchored at Port Vasa, be-
tween the fortress of Rug~ia and Flintike. TMs was the 
remotest point at which the combdlned Christian forces 
had amved, two hundred mi:les short from Cyprus. It was 
not practicall to proceed to Fama:gusta instead. The pOli 
capaoirty there did not allow more than 15 galleys at a 
time. lOl So lit was decided to return to Crete. On 26 Sep-
tember 'the armada harboured at Scarpanto. The Spanish 
Admlira.'l's plans thus came to be reaLised. 
At S1tia on 12 September, Gian Andrea Doria wrote 
down a detaMed account of the .AJl1~es' situation, starting 
from Otranto, a copy of whlich was later forwarded to the 
Grand Master of MaLta by Fra Paolo Fiamberto, the Order's 
rece1ver Qn Genoa.102 Bos!io consdders this document of the 
utmost Iimportancel03 and reproduces it in full. lo.1 Through 
various mgh-soundJing pretexts and ski1fu~ tactica:1: .precau-
tions thalt would outfox the other two admira,ls, DOl',ia at-
tempted to justify his otherwise "inexcusable behaViiour." 
Given that the state of the Venettian armada was a "mutual 
misfortune"105 to the Aillies, not only was he not prepared 
to expose hiis Spanish squadrons to Disk, but he was de-
termined on his pre-selected course of action. "A me noo 
pare," he wrote, "che si possa Vlincere."106 He would not 
stay a day later than 30 September, and that was generous 
of him.l07 The return voyage was long and the imminent 
autUmlll storms were too I1isky. 108 H~s entire Spanish fleet 
rather than the Venetian colony was at stake! Towards the 
end 0If that month Doria saliled westward, arniving with aH 
his gaJlleysl09 tin Messlina on 18 OctoberllO. Nothing had been 
accomplli'Shed. The combilned Christj1an force, though far 
short of the lideal, had coos,isted of 180 galleys, 11 gaJ-
leasses. 40 heavy shlips :i!nc1udling Fausto's gaHeon,lll beslides 
other craft,112 together wMh 1300 cannon and 16,000 
troops.1l3 Braudel believes that with such a naval force, "a 
successful action could have been fought,"114 had it not 
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been partly for Colonna's want of rea11eadershiip and part-
ly for DOf!ia's unwiLLingness to fight.1l5 It ~s here, more 
perhaps than elsewhere, thCl't Zooe's manlifestation of abulia 
is seen at its worst. What was ~t that had !kept him from 
attempting ailone the relief of Cyprus, as he had been in-
structed to do?116 
The three-galley squadron of MaJlIta arrived at the port 
of Illialllia 'in Crete on 26 October,1l7 eight days after the 
Spanish fleet had anchored at Messina. Boslio records Pietro 
Giustiniani's limpresslion after hits first review of "what was 
left of the Venetian armada."118 
It was really very p:itifuQ to see .such a wCl'fge Armada, 
which had been fitted out so magnanimously by that 
Republic, reduced to such a poor state due to the sd1ck-
ness that stiU perslisted as a resullt of the spoilllt meal, 
bad food and the long, un active stay in those ports, and 
espedalJy tin that of Suda which !iIS surroUJl1ded by many 
marshes. 
To make better use of his arl1iva:l ·in Khania, and lest gal-
leys "would rot of tinaction at thaJt port," GiJustiniani was 
on 7 November aSSlilgned to pCl'rticipate tin the organisation 
of the relief forces ·about to be sent to Famatgusta. l19 That 
day Angello Soriano120 reported that PJaili, stationed on the 
Aegean ;is[and of StampaLia (Astipaila·ia), was prepaI'iing an 
attack on the Venem1an fleet illl the. port of Suda dtself. 
This piece of Illews, which turned out to be a\ false alarm, 
once more diverted Zane's plans. l2l Durjng its sojourn in 
the Levant, the ReHgion's squadron suffered from a severe 
outbreak of sickness, with "alcuni CavaHeru e Huom~ni mor-
ti e il1ifermli per tuttO."122 On 12 November CoQonna began 
hiG hl)meward v-0Y':::ge. He chose to be escorted as far as 
Corfu by Giustinianli's squadron than by the best twelve of 
the Venetian g.aJJleys, as the Order had at dts disposaJ the 
services of h1ghly experienced pi~lots, especita!l[y a certain 
Okco Pl1sano, "famoso e pramichitssimo."123 The three gal-
leys of the Order were back in Ma;l;ta on 22 Jal,1uary 1571. 
Freed from the defeatist aWtude of the Al['ies, which 
benumbed aU Chrd:stdan sense of duty, the Old Venetian ad-
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mind made his 'first, and olJJ!ly, seJ:1ious attempt to reNeve 
besieged Cyprus, after seven wholle montlhs of patent 
masterily rirnactiv:ity in the Levant. OnW January 1571 Marco 
Querini, Provvedit.ore dell' Armqta, l24 with 13 gahleys and 4 
ships set s'ari[ from Crete to Famagusta. He found the 
s,ituatton there less precaT'ious than had perihaps been ex-
pected. Mustafa Pasha, having reaulized that the storming of 
Famagusta would prove more difficult than NicoSl1a, "re-
tirred with his army to the most agreeable parts of the iisaand 
for the wllinter."125 MeanwhiJe Quenini: managed to surprise 
two heavy Turklish gatli1eys fu[rry laden with Turks, ammu-
nriltion and foodstuffs. His mission to Famagusta is faithfu1fy 
reported by Bosio.125 
And whiJle the ships were unloading, he carefully brought 
down the ibastionsand filled the trenches which Mustafa 
had constructed around Famagusta, and destroyed the 
forts on the rocks of GambeHa, together wdth the mOlle 
and the J:1idout at Costanza, which the Tur~s had built 
for the grulleys. Querlini spent twenty-two days on these 
deeds ... ; ,ilIl order to a,11eVliate Famagusta and empty 1t 
of those mouths and useless persons, he carl.1ied on his 
ships and ga~leys women, chiildren, old people and all 
others an that city unahle to wield arms. 
On thlis note of hope (<tlndi ,lasdata havendo a Famago-
stani buonra speranza dJi maggioT' Soccorso deHa Lega"127), 
BOB/ia ends hilS narrative of the first phase of the siege' of 
Cyprus. 
Bosio attached exceptiona[ importance to the sliege of 
NicoElia. The attention he accorded 1t in his Istoria is second 
to no other, equaMy dramatic, contemporary event ,in 
Emope - whether the ,rebeLllion of the MOl.'llscos ;Un Gmna-
da,128 the civil and reHg)ious wars which set dl.1ifting France 
rinto comp1ete anarchy 129 or the revolt of the Nethe:dands.13O 
The writer's approach to the episode ID Cyprus betrays the 
attitude, itnterests and quallities of a hi:storian rather than 
those of a chrondder. His narrative is more than a mere 
traJin of events, factual and dry, ref1lect:~ng the chang,jng 
st)llle of sixteenth century history writing. IHs task appears 
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to have been one of probing the complex motirves of man's 
actions, of tracing causes with a modIicum of objecNrviJty and 
in a raJt:JionaJ way, and estaJbilJiishing :in a descriptive, !if not 
analytic, fashion the consequences of this tumultuous event, 
even though his official terms of reference were restricted 
to the glory and performance of the Order of St. John, of 
which he was himself a member. His lis a nisto!I1ian's visJon. 
If the Order's raison d'etre was sni;};l to fight the ,infidel, the 
Ca!lvlinist of the North was no less hereticaJl than the Otto-
man of the East. If the potential supremacy of the Turkish 
power tin the Med1terranean threatened the very existence 
of this mediey,ail. institution, the ideological 'and material CCll11-
sequences of the eruption of the widespread popular up-
heavail in the Netherlands were not less omlinous. Bosio 
only "hints succinctly" and "with every possdhle brevMy" 
to the latter occurrenceI31 but digresses at leisure to "nar-
rate" the siege of Nicosia with sequenHal coherence. 
Bosio's enthusiasm for the early phase of the war of 
Cyprus ,1s not ~ncomprehensihle. The disappoimting outcome 
of the autumn campaJign was to have an immediate and 
profound li:mpact on the Order of St. John. Negottations for 
the League were delayed, at times suspended; at best they 
proved most discouraging. It seemed almost an unattadillable 
ideal.m Bosio's very conaisely drawn ,~mage of Venice du-
ring the W11nter of 1570-71 confirms her "reputation for dup-
l'iaity."133 Her apparent disposiliuion to promote an early set-
tlement of the League, professed by her ambassador in 
Rome, was counterpoised by her aJttempt to illegot~ate sec-
retly wJth the Turk,134- Awareness of this attitude embar-
mssed Dell Monte and caused consternation :in the Council 13;; 
Would not a successfuil outcome of Jacomo Ragazzonli's mis-
sion to ConstantJinople136 encoumge SeHm II~ psychological-
ly and mOraJ1:liy forUilfied by the early vdctory of Nkosia, to 
redlirect his mighty ,armada towards Ma!lta?131 The disen-
gagement of the troops in VaHetta the year before rendered 
the new aiJty defenceless and more Uahle to attack.138 Ever 
since the very first days of hiis magistracy139 Del Monte had 
wished to transfer the Order's headquarters from the Bor-
gol40 to Valletta. Nor was his desire to brea:the fresh Hlfe 
ilnto the otherWJise desolate aity devoid of self-glory. He 
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was consoious that the migration of the Convent across the 
Grand Harbour would give Mm no less repute, no smaller 
t~tle to fame "than that earned by h:is predecessor" who 
had wao~d the first stone. l 4.1 These personai consddeTations 
had been momentanhly subordinated to the tumultuous 
events of 1569-70. But now, reflection on the gravity of the 
siJtuation ,in the MedJiterraneaon, the emergence of new in-
dications of a possible Turlkish threat to Malta and the 
advaonced stage the fOTt'IDcations of Valletta had reached, 
induced the Grand Master to seize the opportunity of realiz-
ing hies aspirations. In these circumstances no safer pre-
cautionary measure142 could be taken than the tr'ansference 
of the entire 'body of the ReLigion to ¥alletta. This would 
necessaniJIy mean hardship and sacni!fice on the part of the 
knights,'43 but there was no alternattve: so thought and 
decreed the Grand Master. On Sunday, 18 March 1571 the 
Order of St. John moved to its !l1ew headquarters on the 
Sceberras peninsula, which was converted into one of the 
"most impregnable" fortresses "of the world, second to no 
ItaHian dty for beauty."lH 
The tripIe aJJ:iance constituting the Holy League was 
not to be fina:liized before 20 May 1571.l<l;' But by the b:me 
the aLLied armada set saH from Messi!l1a on 16 September, 
not ol1ily had Famagusta capituLated and the whole listand 
passed securely into Turkish hands, but the theatre of war 
had shilfted further westward towards the Morea and the 
Ionian cislands. The Cyprus question receded into secondary 
importance. When 0!l1 7 October the combined Christian 
forces wreaked havoc upon the Ottomaon armada, it was 
at the gulf of Lepanto that the action took place. Ln the 
combined Christian fOr'ce of 208 warships, 146 Ma~ta w.as only 
represented by a three-galley squadronl41 under Giustindani, 
ootrusted with the extreme right wling of the exped:ttion. 
Augusta Drane148 descriJbes Itn a somewhat romam:tk fas-
hion, the vailour performed by the knights and Maltese gaol-
leys at Lepanto. 
[The Capitana di Malta] was posted in the very centre 
of the lime of battle, the place of honour being granted 
without opposition to the banmer of St. J oIm; but the 
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other galleys were attached to Don1a's diwsion, and re-
ceived the first attack of Ouloudj Ali. In spite 01£ their 
heroic defence they :were outpowered by numbers: the 
st. Stephen was assa:iJled by three Turkiilsh vessels at 
once and was ;in the utmost danger of being taken, when 
Giusti!l1Ji:ani, perceiiV1ing tJhe danger of his kn1ghts, 
hastened to theirasS1rstanoe and fOl'ced two of the en-
emy's vesseLs to strike. The thilrd :was (hl1 the point of 
doing the same when Ouloudj Alii brought up four other 
gallileys, and then ensued one of the most desperate and 
bloody combats that was wdtnessed throughout the day. 
Every man on board the prior's vessel was slalin with 
the exception of himself and two kn:ights who were all 
however severely wounded ... Giustdlrlian'i: rnlffiseU was 
wounded lin fourteen places; and his galliley, not without 
defenders, fe~l into the hands of the Turks ... 
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